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In this paper, I will try to answer the question: How are we supposed to assess the 
expert’s opinion in an argument from the position of an outsider to the specialized field? by 
placing it in the larger context of the political status of epistemic authority. In order to do this I 
will first sketch the actual debate around the problem of expertise in a democracy and relate this 
to the issue of the status of science in society. Secondly, I will review how Douglas Walton’s 
pragma-dialectical approach offers a practical procedure to assess the expert bias from a 
nonprofessional’s perspective. Thirdly, I will introduce the problem of group bias using insights 
from Bohman and Fischer and show how Walton’s solution does not address this specific type of 
bias. Lastly, I will try proposing a revision of Walton’s solution in order to address this problem. 
In order to make the explanation more easy to follow I will use a case study concerning the 
medical expertise in the public debate on second-hand smoke.  
Keywords: expert opinion, deliberative democracy, democracy, pragma-dialectics, presumptive 
form, argumentation theory, social epistemology, group bias, fallacy. 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Living in a democracy implies that we, the citizens, delegate the right to 
decide on public matters to the politicians we elect. A similar type of transfer 
takes place when we delegate knowledge to the experts (Bohman, 1999, 590-607) 
because it is assumed that we will not question the experts at each step or 
decision, although in specialised knowledge we maintain our right to do so from 
time to time. Because we live in a society where the amount of general is so 
immense that nobody is expected to know it all, we need some form of 
“cognitive division of labor.” (Bohman, 1999). Therefore, we expect certain 
people to become specialized in narrow fields and we take their opinion in the 
respective field as being as close as possible to the common ideal of objective 
knowledge. Nevertheless, there is always the possibility that an expert could 
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abuse this power of specialized knowledge because experts are hard to verify by 
the laypeople. How are we then to assess the expert’s opinion in an argument 
from the position of an outsider to the specialized field? The answer to this 
interrogation depends on what sides we take on a larger issue regarding the 
place of the expert in a democratic and political deliberation. Democracy has 
generalised the practice of using expert panels in order to decide controversial 
issues – be it in tribunals or policy forums. Even though experts are asked for 
their opinion, the decision makers (judges, politicians, managers) are usually 
non-experts in those fields and the final decision hinges a lot not only on the 
credibility of the experts, but on how people have been accustomed to deal with 
experts: will they trust blindly the experts or will they question their judgements? 
What are we expected to do normally in a democracy: question the experts all 
the way in the name of our rational autonomy or bow with silent respect?  
In this paper, I will try to answer the research question by placing it in the 
larger context of the political status of epistemic authority. In order to do this I 
will first sketch the actual debate around the problem of expertise in a democracy 
from an epistemic point of view, and relate this problem to the debate about the 
status of science in society, which is an ongoing debate in social epistemology. 
Secondly, I will review how Douglas Walton’s pragma-dialectical approach 
offers a practical procedure to assess the expert bias from a nonprofessional 
perspective. Thirdly, I will introduce the problem of group bias using insights 
from Bohman and Fischer and show how Walton’s solution does not address 
this specific type of bias. Lastly, I will try proposing a refinement of Walton’s 
solution in order to address this problem. In order to make the explanation more 
easy to follow I will use a case study concerning the usage of medical expertise 
in the public debate on second-hand smoke.  
 
 
II. The Problem of Expertise in a Democracy 
 
Political deliberation is, in what Mansbridge et al. call the “classical 
paradigm”, a rational debate among people with conflicting opinions in which 
self-interest should play no part (Mansbridge, 2010, 66). However, Mansbridge 
et al. argue that we should abandon this ideal for a more realistic deliberation 
because self-interest, even if it might seem to introduce an emotional dimension 
to the discussion, is essential in understanding the other side’s motivations and 
instrumental for reaching an agreement. “Including self-interest in deliberative 
democracy reduces the possibility of exploitation and obfuscation, introduces 
information that facilitates reasonable solutions and the identification of integrative 
outcomes, and also motivates vigorous and creative deliberation.” (72-73).  
The “classical paradigm” excluded self-interest from the deliberation 
because it was seen as a way of introducing “irrational” elements in a discussion 
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that should remain governed by reason alone. However, since most debates are 
about issues that affect personally the parties involved, openly revealing what is 
each ones’ self-interest will lead to a more clear starting point for negotiations 
because only when we know why the other party asks certain things, we can 
find alternate ways to reach the same results but through different policies or 
actions. In addition, a debate anchored only in the sphere of reason alone will 
leave behind the democratic assumption that there is not one single common 
good, but a plurality of goods (68) that need equal consideration.  
Nevertheless, if political deliberations are centred on the self-interested 
parties, how are experts to be employed in such settings? Ideally, in a 
democratic debate each side should have access to an expert’s opinion to defend 
its own self-interest. However, even if both sides use an equal number of 
experts, this does not solve the problem of the authority of the expert’s opinion 
in a democracy. How much should the expert’s opinion weigh as a premise in a 
general debate? What is the role of the expert in a democratic debate? 
Depending on our views of the social role of science, there are multiple 
answers possible, ranging from the empiricist view to the constructivist model 
seen as extremes of a spectrum. We could see the expert either as an objective 
and incontestable source of truth, or as a member of a community of consensus 
who builds theories in accordance to the social needs of his setting.  
 
 
II.1. The Objective Expert 
 
In the empiricist framework, the expert is seen as an unbiased person that 
looks sincerely for truth while working under the assumption that there is an 
objective truth out there and that it can be found. This is what Collins et al. 
would call the “first wave of science” (Collins, Evans, 2002, 235-296), which 
had its peak around 1950s-1960s. At that time the experts were very highly 
esteemed and “it was inconceivable that decision-making in matters that 
involved science and technology could travel in any other direction than from 
the top down” (239) therefore it was not the place of the laypeople to question 
the expert from their bottom-up perspective.  
The problem with experts that work in this framework is that they do not 
see any reason for including the public’s views in any debate because they see 
the technical matters as being too complicated and hard to explain to the laymen. 
A feeling of esotericism emerges from this attitude about scientific expertise 
that survives even today. Cook et al. performed a study in 2004 in which they 
found by analysing the language of experts in the case of genetically modified 
(GM) organisms, that the experts thought of the public’s opinions on the issue 
of GM as being only of an emotional nature, and that "this characterization of 
public opinion appeared to free the GM scientists we interviewed from having 
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to engage with public disquiet.” (Cook, 2004, 439). The scientists working 
under an empiricist assumption of science see themselves as educators and their 
engagement with the public as only one-sided, with the expert speaking and 
educating, while the public listens respectfully and learns. A two-way dialogue 
seems impossible unless the public gains the same level of expertise, which is 
unlikely to happen.  
 
 
II.2. The Expert in a Constructivist Paradigm of Science 
 
In the constructivist paradigm, the focus shifts from the empirical practice 
to the way in which “scientific knowledge is used in social institutions such as 
schools, courts, policymaking agencies, and public deliberations. These investigations 
focus on the issue of how expertise has emerged, how it is socially constructed, 
and how it gets taken up by various institutions” (Fischer, 2009, 140). In this 
paradigm science will be “reconceptualised as a social activity” primarily while 
making scientific truth seem relative and just another type of discourse which 
tries to gain authority while competing with other discourses. Scientists are not 
regarded as objective searchers of truth anymore, but rather people who 
construct the truth in closed communities of consensus. This position on science 
is a radical extreme of a more nuanced spectrum, yet we should keep in mind 
the possibility of a group bias in which the individual expert acts as sincerely 
and honest as possible, without being aware of the larger context in which his 
science unfolds.  
 
 
III. Douglas Walton’s Solution to the Problem of Expert Bias 
 
In this section, I will present Douglas Walton’s approach to dealing with 
the possibility of a fallacious appeal to expert opinion and his 5-questions 
method for establishing the reliability of the expert. His approach comes from a 
pragma-dialectical perspective and I will use this method in the following pages.  
 
 
III.1. Pragma-Dialectics 
 
Pragma-dialectics is a method developed by the Amsterdam School 
authors Van Eemeren and Grootendorst who proposed that we assess arguments 
by looking primarily at the dialogue setting in which arguments appear natively. 
Thinking about pros and cons in one’s head is not really an argument, according 
to this school of thought, only by engaging in a debate with an opponent the real 
argument can unfold. Dialogue is primarily “a means of resolving differences of 
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opinion which must operate within particular rules for critical discussion.” 
(Groarke, 2013). Consequently, a good counter-objection has no value if it was 
not included at the time of the dialogue, because what is taken into consideration 
are only the utterances, commitments and concessions one makes in the 
dialogue with the opponent – these are called “externalised commitments.” (van 
Eerman, 2007, 3). This means also that one is responsible for “what one has put 
forward, either directly or indirectly, and for what one, explicitly or implicitly, 
has committed oneself to.” (2). 
A dialogue has four specific stages in this theory: “confrontation, opening, 
argumentation, and closing”
3
 with each stage ruled by specific constraints. A 
fallacy in the pragma-dialectic approach is understood as a “violation of the 
rules for critical discussion.”
4
 Walton and Krabbe proposed that we group 
dialogue types according to several criteria: goals, rules, initial situation, and 
the aims of the participants. They distinguish six possible main types of 
dialogue that can, in turn, be mixed and combined (Walton, 1995, 66).  For the 
purposes of this paper, I shall look only at the deliberation dialogue, which 
seems to be the most relevant for the political debates that are the focus of this paper. 
Deliberation dialogue has mainly a practical purpose that is coming to an 
agreement in solving a certain problem, according to Walton (Walton, 2010, 13-24). 
This is a collaborative type of dialogue and the result will be a proposal that is 
“optimal for the group may not be optimal for any individual participant.” (16).  
There is no hidden information in this type of dialogue, because each participant 
has to share what her interests and preferences are in order to reach a common 
agreement and withholding a personal interest would lead to no visible 
advantage (16). The deliberation takes place in eight stages: “open, inform, propose, 
consider, revise, recommend, confirm and close.” (16). There is no actual burden 
of proof in the deliberation dialogue, explains Walton, because “the central aim 
is not to prove something but to explain something that the questioner claims to 
fail to understand.” (16). However, a similar function to the burden of proof can 
be seen in the requirement to justify one’s proposal, Walton calls this a “burden 
of defending or justifying a proposal” (16) because the participants have to 
show how their own proposal actually leads to achieving a common goal.  
 
 
III.2. The Presumptive Argumentation Scheme 
 
Whenever we delegate knowledge in theoretical or practical matters to 
someone else, we appeal to expert opinion. There are two possible types of authority 
according to Walton epistemic or cognitive, and prescriptive – meaning any 
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person with power that can make us do something (Walton, 1997, 77). Authority, 
taken in a larger sense, applies to anyone with “judicial or administrative power” 
and in the narrower sense, “someone with epistemic access to something we 
would normally not have.” (84).  
Appeal to expert opinion in a dialogue occurs when one of the 
interlocutors cannot explain directly the facts that motivate his proposal, but 
instead cites the opinion of an expert in the field that also holds that assertion to 
be true. This appeal is by no means decisive for the entire discussion, but it does 
“shift the burden of proof” (133) from the proponent to the opponent who has to 
justify why he cannot accept the expert’s opinion.  
What makes the argument from expert opinion interesting from a 
dialectical point of view is the nature of the argumentation scheme. The 
argument from expert opinion does not use a deductive or inductive form to 
draw conclusions from the premises, rather a presumptive scheme. According to 
Woods and Walton, the defeasible argument has the following form:  
 
“1. X is a reliable authority in domain K.  
 2. p pertains to K 
 3. X asserts that p.  
 4. is coherent with relevant information obtained from other factors.  
 .·. p.” (Woods, Walton, 1974, 146).   
 
A presumptive argument is defeasible in the context of the dialogue that 
generated it. This type of argument appeals foremost to the plausibility of the 
reasoning articulated in the dialogue context and it should be accepted only 
temporary, until new evidence appears, while it remains open to future criticism. 
Even if the opponent accepts all the premises of the argument, he is not bound 
to accept the conclusion – as it was the case with deductive arguments. It is a 
type of argument used in contexts of insufficient information: when people ask 
an expert’s opinion, they are in a state of insufficient information, but this state 
is not permanent because the non-expert has always the option of asking the 
advice of other experts, or just of challenging the internal coherence of the 
expert’s argumentation.  
When we accept a person as an expert in a certain field, this implies that 
we think that the expert's opinion in that particular field is “worth having – but 
not infallible.” (Walton, 2010, 101)
5
 Even when all critical inquiries have been 
successfully answered by the expert, “the argument could still be defeated if 
new evidence comes into the case that provides a rebuttal to the original 
argument.” (Walton, 1997, 78). The expert’s warrant premise has the form of “a 
Toulmin warrant” which, according to Walton, means that “it does not hold 
universally, but only subject to exceptions or countervailing instances that may 
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arise.” (Walton, 2006, 750). However, in the case of political decisions which 
result in new policies, there is no way of coming back and revising the expert 
opinion, the conclusions of the expert are taken to be fixed and unchangeable 
from a practical point of view.  
 
 
III.3. The Examination Dialogue 
 
The dialogue in which the expert can be asked to present and justify his 
professional statement is called an “examination dialogue” by Walton and 
usually takes place in a court setting. (746). By testing the expert’s reasons 
through an examination dialogue, the examiner accomplishes two goals: first, 
he finds out the raw information needed, and secondly inquires the expert 
regarding the reasons for his statement (746). The second goal is more 
important from an argumentative point of view. The main question Walton tries 
to answer is how does one critically question an expert from the position of an 
outsider to the field of expertise? 
The examination dialogue is a “species of information-seeking dialogue” 
(2006, 746) which shifts at some point into a persuasion dialogue as the 
examiner asks to be persuaded by the expert of the truth of a certain claim. 
Walton names this shift in dialogue a “dialectical shift” which is a “transition 
during a sequence of moves from one type of dialogue to another.” (756). Such 
a transition should be avoided in formal dialogues but Walton argues that “in 
any real case of natural language argumentation, such shifts are extremely 
common.” (756). The information-seeking dialogue is a non-adversarial 
exchange, the main goal of one participant being to gather information while the 
other participant, easily identifiable with the expert, wishes to share the 
information. (Walton, 2010, 13)
6
. 
In an examination dialogue the burden of proof typically shifts “back and 
forth, from one side to the other, during the course of a dialogue” (Walton, 2006, 752)
7
 
because, just as the expert is expected to motivate his claims, so does the 
examiner who needs to explain why he chose to question a certain premise. 
Once the expert has explained satisfactorily a premise, the burden of proof 
passes on to the examiner who has to show why that proof is insufficient. 
 In such a dialogue there are three forms of valid inquiry (757): the first 
one requires that the expert clarifies what he means by certain terms (for 
example one could ask the expert “what do you mean by [technical term] x in 
common language?”); the second one regards the logical form of the expert 
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testimony (for example if it seems to the layman that the expert is contradicting 
himself in two different assertions, he can ask the expert to clarify this.) (757). 
At the third level of inquiry, the examiner may ask different questions that draw 
on previous established points in order to make the examiner reveal a possible 
internal consistency of his beliefs. The third level acts as a test, but it is not a 
mere fact-checking test, but rather an internal consistency check (761) which 
verifies what are the reasons that the expert has for holding certain views. At 
this level, the examiner may question the values, beliefs or biases of an expert. 
 
“At the third level, the findings of the first two levels are processed, and conclusions are 
drawn in the form of hypotheses. The third level comprises a critical discussion of the 
findings of the first two levels.” (759-760). 
 
According to Walton, there are 6 types of questions that an examiner 
might ask an expert in order to assess the credibility of the expert opinion 
regarding his assertion A: 
 
“1.  Expertise question: How credible is E as an expert source? 
  2.  Field question: Is E an expert in the field that A is in? 
  3.  Opinion question: What did E assert that implies A? 
  4.  Trustworthiness question: Is E personally reliable as a source? 
  5.  Consistency question: Is A consistent with what other experts assert? 
  6.  Backup evidence question: Is [E]’s assertion based on evidence?” (Walton, 1997, 232)8.  
 
For a broader perspective on this questionnaire, we can turn to Goodwin 
(Goodwin, 2010, 138) who re-frames the six criteria in terms of the 
principal/agent problem. Thus the six questions would fall into two main groups: 
1-4 are the ones that assess whether the expert is biased (the adverse selection) 
and 5-6 would try to find out if, during the testimony, the expert is not acting in 
his full capacity (the moral hazard problem which appears when an expert tries 
to employ as little effort as possible or just says what the laymen want to hear) 
(Goodwin, 2010, 138). This is a more clear explanation of what exactly we 
want to know about the expert before accepting him in this role, and it helps us 
understand what the purpose of the questions selected by Walton is. Goodwin 
also proposes that we take into consideration the community opinions about an 
expert (through forums and public websites) as supplementary ways of 
checking the expertise from the position of the outsiders of the field. 
According to Walton, the appeal to expert opinion is a fallacy only when 
it does not fulfil one of the six criteria quoted previously, in other words when 
the expert quoted is not reliable as an expert, does not act in his full capacity as 
an expert, has a personal bias, or when the expert opinion is used deductively 
instead of inductively by the one who quotes it. In the following pages, I will try 
                                                 
8  In Appeal to Expert Opinion: Arguments from Authority. 
THE APPEAL TO EXPERT OPINION IN CONTEXTS OF POLITICAL DELIBERATION 
AND THE PROBLEM OF GROUP BIAS 
 
99 
to show that the question of the expert’s bias is more complicated than Walton’s 
initial assessment and that an appeal to expert opinion can fulfil all the formal 
criteria proposed by Walton and still be fallacious.  
 
 
IV. The Problem of Group Bias 
 
Returning to the initial question on how should experts act in a 
democracy, Bohman
9
 shows that the delegation of knowledge to experts poses a 
fundamental problem to democracy. By dividing the epistemological tasks and 
delegating to experts a certain piece of knowledge which we could not come to 
learn even in principle, we risk supporting the formation of an elite of 
knowledge (Bohman, 591). This requires that we find a way in which we make 
science “more democratic.” (591). Bohman proposes that we chose a pragmatic 
solution to this problem by adopting Habermas’s model of a “critical 
interaction” between the expert and the public (597). In this habermasian model, 
the public would be mediating between the experts and the politicians (597), 
and this would place the larger public on an equal footing with both sides 
because the public would have a crucial role in every debate. The expert’s 
knowledge would be then placed in “the context of public accountability and 
testing of credibility” (604) and we would need institutions that would allow for 
a public inquiry of the experts in a democratic way. One notices that Bohman’s 
proposal is in accord with Mansbridge’s ideal of deliberation, because both take 
into account the public self-interest as a valid basis for inquiry. “The question 
for the democratic division of labor is not whether science is a “democratic” and 
“communal” institution (…), but how to establish credibility across 
communities of inquiry, each with their own interests and intersecting, but often 
conflicting criteria of relevance and judgment” (599). 
According to Fischer, an “epistemological disjunction” divides the 
“scientific reason of the technical community and the practical reason of the 
public sphere.” (Fischer, 161). This implies that even if we take the experts’ 
propositions at their face value, a dilemma of practical reasoning remains: what 
to do with this knowledge? More precisely, can we incorporate the expert's 
interests in the democratic debate on the collective interest? Fisher points out 
that the expert does not necessarily have a personal interest in the debate (the 
so-called personal bias) but that his position as a scientist representing a 
community of scientists might pose a bias in itself:  
 
“Whereas science was accepted in earlier periods as a disinterested pursuit of truth, it is 
today also seen by many – not altogether wrongly – as an interested group advancing its 
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own status, both materially and socially. This results in various ways from the central role 
conferred on it in politics and policy, both wittingly and unwittingly. (...) For example, as 
science has become more and more dependent on public largess for its research projects, 
the scientific community’s advice about funding projects is intricately bound up with the 
advance of the community's own interests.” (Fischer, 153-154) 
 
To counteract this danger, Fischer proposes that experts should act only 
in the role of “epistemic translation,” that they translate for the lay public what a 
certain policy decision would imply for their lives. 
Types of public expertise can be roughly categorised in two types: 
normative and substantive. When the issue at hand is of a normative nature, 
usually a question requires only a yes /no answer such as “should we legalize 
same-sex marriage?” Most of the time, the organizers of the debate will identify 
the supporters of the two opposing sides and invite an equal number of experts 
for each side of the debate. This implies that we know in advance each expert’s 
allegiance to a particular side and the question of bias becomes then merely 
secondary to other concerns.  
In the substantive case however, when the expert is neutral and 
supposedly does not take any side before the discussion, we should always have 
in mind the possibility of expert bias. If the expert is not present and someone 
else quotes the expert’s opinion, we should inquire whether there is a fallacy at 
some point. How can one question the expert in the matter at hand in order to 
reveal his biases? Walton’s questions deal mostly with the authenticity of the 
expert. The consistency question does not help us much if there are two sides of 
the debate and there is already another contradicting expertise. In the rare case 
that expert E is the only one in the field maintaining that A is the case, then he 
can be rejected as an expert because he does not fulfil the consistency criteria. 
Nevertheless, what if an expert is trustworthy in his field and he asserts that A 
together with other fellow experts, yet the assertion that A is very helpful for a 
certain company that has been funding research in that area? A good example 
are the studies over the carcinogenic effects of second-hand smoke funded by 
tobacco companies
10
. 
 
 
V. Case Study: Environmental Tobacco Smoke (ETS) 
 
In a study done by Francis et al. on expert testimonies in court related to 
ETS, they found out that expert witnesses for the defence used a common tactic 
when confronted with epidemiological studies about the effects of second-hand 
smoke: they emphasized the “limitations of epidemiologic research, raising 
methodological and statistical issues, and disputing biological plausibility.” 
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(Francis, Shea, 2006, iv 68). In this way, the experts were practically asking for 
“an unachievable standard for establishing the mechanism of disease.” (Francis, 
Shea, 2006, iv 68). For example, when experts were confronted with the 
statistics that people married with smokers have a 25% more chance of getting 
lung cancer than those married with non-smokers, the experts called this figure 
as relatively low compared with the 2000% chance for smokers themselves of 
getting lung-cancer. Although a 25% risk is small compared to a 2000% risk, 
the risk-assessment cannot be left only in the hands of the experts because it is 
not the expert's place to say whether a certain risk is acceptable, rather it 
concerns the stakeholders, the people who actually have to face this risk.  
Another argumentative tactic by the expert witnesses was to say that the 
epidemiological studies who outlined the 25% increase in lung-cancer risk were 
showing nothing but a correlation and then they cited the well-known Humean 
view that correlation is not causation. Francis et al. call this stance an 
unrealistic standard. In addition, when saying that we cannot explain how 
exactly second hand smoke affects the lungs, the experts ask for a level of 
evidence “in terms of mechanistic understanding that cannot be reached.” 
(Francis, Shea, 2006, iv 74). These questions of a general philosophical 
relevance are misplaced in a public debate where a decision has to be reached in 
a limited amount of time. Sometimes the financial ties of the experts and the 
tobacco industry are revealed and their testimony loses legitimacy, but this 
cannot be always the case. Can we then, based on a pragma-dialectic approach 
alone, discover this hidden bias of the expert? 
The 6 criteria proposed by Walton function only inside the empirical 
framework which analyses testimonies looking for logical consistency and 
evidence in the real world. However, the expert bias is more complicated than 
just using unsupported data or misinterpreting it. It regards what kind of 
scientific standards are acceptable for the expert called to testimony and for the 
public involved in the debate. Because this is a highly controversial and 
technical debate, its assumptions are almost never brought explicitly into question.  
I have identified so far three ways in which the expert opinion can 
be questioned: 
First, inside an empiricist framework, we should look if an assertion A is 
justified in itself, unrelated to the expert that has uttered it. This can be done 
either by looking for the evidence on which the expert bases his claim, or for 
internal coherence in the expert testimony. This would correspond to the third 
level of inquiry in Walton’s classification. (Walton, 2006, 757)
11
.  
Secondly, inside a constructivist framework of science, we can test the 
expert’s objectivity by looking whether expert E is a recognized expert in his 
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field, or if there are other experts who claim the same thing. The result of the 
inquiry would reveal who is the community of scientists that backs up our 
expert and, if we ourselves agree with that particular community’s views on 
science, we can view this to be an “objective” truth.  
Thirdly, in a true postmodernist setting, we could ask ourselves what kind 
of science we want to accept as reliable, what criterions are good-enough inside 
for our science and what are the common goals that we want the scientific 
inquiry to serve. Because we, the public, decide what type of science serves best 
out interests, we can be involved as an equal partner with the expert in the 
debate because at this level, all interests are equally legitimate and the expertise 
loses its superior epistemic status.  
Let us examine the following example of a dialogue in which we could 
question an expert: 
 
Proponent: We should not ban smokers from restaurants because second-
hand smoke is not harmful. (S) 
Opponent: Why do you say that? (why S?) 
Proponent: Because professor E says that S and E is an expert in 
medicine (T). (T, T->S)  
[Assumption accepted by both at this stage: S belongs to the set of 
medical sentences in which E is an expert] 
 
From here, there are four possible tactics of challenging this inference. 
 
Tactic 1: questioning the expert’s reasons  
Opponent: Why does E say that second-hand smoke is not harmful?  
Proponent: Because epidemiological studies show negligible risks. (R)  
Opponent: Why are these risks negligible?  
Proponent: Because expert E says that R and E is an expert in medicine  
Opponent: However, the R statement does not belong to medicine, but 
rather to risk assessment, which should be established by the public, so E has no 
authority in this particular matter. [because R does not belong to the set of expertise]  
Proponent: I concede. 
 
Tactic 2: questioning the expert's authority 
Opponent: Why do you say that E is an expert? 
Proponent: Because he is well recognized by his colleagues, and has 
published in peer-reviewed journals in his field. 
Opponent: Is E the only expert who says that S? 
Proponent: No, there are a few other scholars who say that S. 
Opponent: I provisionally accept S until new evidence appears.  
[the expert opinion was accepted under the presumptive reasoning scheme] 
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Tactic 3: questioning the expert’s bias  
Opponent: Does E have any personal interest to say that T is the case?  
Proponent: I do not know. Why does it matter? 
Opponent: If a tobacco company sponsors his work, then expert E might 
have a reason to favour certain studies and ignore other relevant studies.  
[At this point, neither the proponent nor the opponent have enough 
information to assess the expert’s bias. The dialogue may go in any direction 
according to the level of information they have on the expert.] 
The expert’s personal bias can be questioned in more than one way: “Is 
the expert E in a position to benefit personally if we accept that A is the case?” 
A second way could be “Is the expert E in a position to benefit as an authority-
figure if we accept him as being an expert?” and, related to this, “Is the expert’s 
field of expertise likely to benefit/enlarge if we accept his authority in the matter at 
hand?” For example when we ask an expert in geology to advise whether we should 
mine in a certain area. His expertise is not just about the mere facts which 
indicate whether there are pockets of oil or not, but it becomes a prescriptive 
expertise, telling us what to do if there is oil there. However, this decision 
should belong to the stakeholders only, and should be taken only after all the 
interests have been laid out on the table. An epistemic expert acting out more 
than a consultant in the values-interests deliberation level is surpassing his expertise.  
 
Tactic 4: questioning the expert’s scientific standards  
Opponent: Are expert E’s standards unrealistic for an epidemiological study? 
[At this point, the dialogue turns into a deliberative debate in which the 
participants decide what the common accepted scientific standard is for their 
personal interests. Only after these personal interests have been made explicit, 
the expert's authority can be accepted. ] 
 
 
VI. A Revised Questionnaire 
 
In the light of the four examples mentioned above, I propose that we 
improve Walton’s questionnaire and add to it 4 more types of questions in order 
to assess the social bias and the group bias of the expert. The initial 6 questions 
were the following: 
 
“1.  Expertise question: How credible is E as an expert source? 
2. Field question: Is E an expert in the field that A is in? 
3. Opinion question: What did E assert that implies A? 
4. Trustworthiness question: Is E personally reliable as a source? 
5. Consistency question: Is A consistent with what other experts assert? 
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6. Backup evidence question: Is [E]’s assertion based on evidence?” (Walton, 1997, 223)12. 
One can easily notice that questions 1-4 are about the expert’s person, question 5 places 
the expert in the field and works also under a constructivist assumption of science, while 
question 6 functions in an empiricist framework.  
In order to extend this set of inquires I propose that we add the following questions: 
7. Is the expert offering a prescriptive advice when he was appointed only for fact 
checking? 
8. Does the expert E have a personal interest in the matter at hand?  
9. Does the expert E have a group interest in the matter at hand?  
10. Is the type of science promoted by the expert consistent with the public interests of the 
society at this point in time? 
 
Question 7 will cover the normative/factual distinction and prevent 
experts from overstepping their boundaries.  
Question 8 takes into consideration the cases when an expert is paid by a 
company or has some emotional reason to support a certain cause.  
Question 9 takes into account the group interest of the field of experts; 
such a group may want to extend their authority over matters that do not 
concern them in order to gain social status or funding. 
Question 10 is the most difficult to answer and might be seen as a meta-
question that frames the previous 9 questions. In the case of the tobacco smoke, 
it was obvious that the standards required by the experts for scientific 
explanation were unrealistic. Depending on the time and place of a society, 
people may accept the risks associated with a nuclear reactor near their homes 
or not. Before the Fukushima disaster, the risk assessment on a possible 
accident was in acceptable limits for the locals, and thus was part of a socially 
accepted standard of science. After Fukushima however, our ways of assessing 
risk underwent a radical transformation. It is not that the risk of a nuclear 
catastrophe increased worldwide, just that the global context changed and 
people did not accept previous levels of risk anymore. Depending on the stakes 
at hand and on the community’s guidelines on what constitutes reliable 
scientific standards, an expert may or may not be accepted as an authority figure.  
 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
Experts do not appear in a vacuum. They fulfil a certain role in a society 
and their status depends on the degree of trust that a society delegates to them. 
The question about how much authority should an expert have is not a detached 
pondering about the objectivity of science, rather a matter that concerns us all. 
This issue should be settled like many other issues in a public deliberation 
where all interests, including the expert’s, have been laid out in the open.  
                                                 
12  In Appeal to Expert Opinion: Arguments from Authority. 
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Appeal to expert opinion, when used in a political deliberation, could 
become a fallacy in at least three different situations. Walton described how the 
expert’s authority could be used in an unjustified way, just by name-dropping, 
or by making unjustified claims. The expert can also have a personal bias in the 
issue and this is harder to uncover by examination dialogue alone. However, 
Walton’s questionnaire does not cover the more general type of bias associated 
with the position of expert itself. Depending on the views we, as a community, 
have on science, we can take an empiricist approach and trust experts blindly, or 
we can be constructivist and question their standards. However, either way, if 
we approach the matter from a pragmatist perspective, we should take into 
account the self-interests of all the stakeholders involved and consider the 
expert just another interested party in the debate at hand, with no special 
authority claim.  
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